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“Fleeing Gangs, Children Head to U.S. Border” 
New York Times July 9, 2014
In summer of 2014, headlines throughout the hemi-
sphere called attention to an unfolding tragedy: the 
plight of Central Americans fleeing north to escape 
the violence engulfing their communities. The stagger-
ing number of migrants seeking refuge sparked a great 
deal of debate within the United States, particularly 
due to the large numbers of children. In 2014, approx-
imately 57,000 unaccompanied minors traveled from 
Central America to Mexico, continuing north to cross 
the U.S. border illegally. Once in the United States, 
most children turned themselves over to U.S. Border 
Control agents and faced swift deportation proceed-
ings. Others have been temporarily reunited with 
family members throughout the United States, waiting 
for the courts to decide their fate. Thus far in 2015, the 
number of unaccompanied child apprehensions on the 
southwest border has declined compared to 2014. efforts at the behest of U.S. officials. Central 
Americans are still fleeing, but many are detained in 
Mexico before they reach the U.S. border.
The large numbers of children fleeing Central 
America has led politicians, pundits, and average peo-
ple to question U.S. immigration policy, deportation 
proceedings, and criteria for refugee status. The United 
States plays a critical role in this crisis. U.S. demand for 
drugs drives much of the violence in Central America 
today, and traffickers are able to capitalize on easy 
access to guns and ammunition in the United States to 
improve the armed might of gangs and drug cartels. 
Despite the electoral commitments of both Democrats 
and Republicans, serious efforts to reform U.S. immi-
gration policy have languished. 
The migration emergency, however, is not just a product 
of U.S. policies on drugs, guns, and immigration. Some 
Central American governments have exacerbated the 
The large numbers of people fleeing Guatemala,  
El Salvador, and Honduras testify not only to the vio-
lence of illicit markets but also to the failure of these 
countries’ governments to fulfill their most impor-
tant task—protecting the lives of their citizens. 
However, some border crossing zones (particu-
larly the Big Bend and Yuma sectors) report sharp 
increases in apprehension rates, indicating that 
migrants and traffickers may be adjusting their 
tactics to try to elude U.S. border agents.1 In Mexico, 
apprehension and deportation rates of Central 
American migrants have almost doubled this year, 
as Mexican officials have ramped up enforcement 
security crisis that created the exodus 
in the first place. Throughout Central 
America, organized crime and corre-
sponding violence thrive in areas with 
weak and unresponsive governments. 
The large numbers of people fleeing 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras 
testify not only to the violence of illicit 
markets but also to the failure of these 
countries’ governments to fulfill their 
most important task—protecting the 
lives of their citizens. 
In contrast, some Central American 
countries have been able to contain 
the crime crisis and provide a mini-
mum level of safety for their people. 
Nicaragua and Panama face some of 
the same challenges as Guatemala, 
El Salvador, and Honduras, yet their 
response to the security crisis is mark-
edly different. Nicaragua and Panama 
FIGURE 1: HOMICIDE RATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO (UNODC 2014)
have invested in the creation of civil-
ian police forces that aim to respond 
to the needs of citizens, and they have 
developed public security policies that 
favor prevention and rehabilitation 
over repression. Rather than rely-
ing on militarized tactics to subdue 
suspected criminals, Nicaragua and 
Panama have sought to invest in com-
munity policing models and address 
the socio-economic conditions that 
allow crime to thrive in the first place. 
The experiences of these two coun-
tries offer important insights. They 
demonstrate that new democracies 
can overcome the challenges posed 
by poverty, inequality, and authori-
tarian rule, and invest in institutions 
that uphold the rights and safety of 
their citizens. To understand how 
The experiences of [Nicaragua 
and Panama] offer important 
insights. They demonstrate that 
new democracies can overcome 
the challenges posed by poverty, 
inequality, and authoritarian 
rule, and invest in institutions 
that uphold the rights and safety 
of their citizens. 








Central American governments can 
respond to crime in ways that will not 
prompt their citizens to flee, we can 
learn from the evolution of policing 
practices in Nicaragua and Panama, 
and how police have interacted with 
the communities they serve. 
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The Security Crisis  
in Central America
In 2013, more than a third of all 
global homicides occurred in the 
Americas, home to only 14 percent 
of the world’s population.2 Central 
America tied with sub-Saharan 
Africa as the most violent region in 
the world. In the Northern Triangle 
countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, 
and Honduras), average homicide 
rates in 2013 were more than 12 
times higher than the U.S. rate of 
4.7 per 100,000. At 90.4 per 100,000, 
homicide rates in Honduras are the 
highest in the world.
Citizens in the region have 
observed these rising rates of vio-
lent crime with alarm. In a 2014 
poll, respondents in five out of six 
Central American countries identi-
fied crime as the gravest problem 
in their country.3 Figure 2 reports 
the percentage of respondents in 
each country who indicated crime 
was the most pressing national 
problem. In every country except 
Nicaragua, crime eclipsed concerns 
over economic issues like unem-
ployment, poverty, and inequality. 
Furthermore, recent research links 
Central Americans’ experiences and 
perceptions of crime to an increased 
likelihood of migration.4 Given these 
circumstances, it isn’t surprising that 
the countries with the most serious 
crime—Guatemala, Honduras, and 
El Salvador—are generating such 
high numbers of emigrants, particu-
larly to the United States. 
Costa Rica and Panama have very 
low levels of emigration in general. 
Rates of violent crime in Costa 
Rica are almost double those of the 
United States, but still far lower than 
the regional average. Crime is of 
concern, but it has not motivated 
a large wave of emigration, in part 
because of the economic benefits 
provided to citizens through Costa 
Rica’s social welfare system. Similar 
to Costa Rica, rates of violent crime 
in Panama are quite high compared 
to the United States but still lower 
than the regional average. The 
violent crime rate is triple that of the 
United States, and above the thresh-
old that international organizations 
consider detrimental to a country’s 
stability.5 Still, as this brief will show 
later, citizens have greater confidence 
that their police can provide public 
safety, reducing the hopelessness that 
often motivates emigration. Panama’s 
recent economic boom creates fur-
ther incentives for citizens to stay. 
Nicaragua has a higher level of emi-
gration, but migrants predominantly 
head south to Costa Rica instead of 
north to the United States. Following 
a 1998 guest worker agreement 
between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, 
large numbers of Nicaraguans have 
migrated for seasonal and long-term 
employment opportunities. In 
Nicaragua, public fear of crime is very 
low. At 11.3 per 100,000, homicide 
rates are low for the region (though 
still high by international standards), 
and for the past two decades, citizens 
have expressed far more confidence 
that their justice institutions can han-
dle increases in violent crime com-
pared to citizens in the other Central 
American countries.6 Nicaraguan 
migration is not tied to security con-
cerns, but to economic ones.
Origins of the Crisis
How did the security crisis, and its 
subsequent refugee crisis, begin? 
Much of the answer lies in the politi-
cal and economic changes that swept 
the region in the 1990s. During this 
time, Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Nicaragua signed peace treaties to 
end decades of civil war and adopted 
democratic forms of governance. 
These nascent democracies had to 
create new domestic police forces 
FIGURE 2: PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME IN CENTRAL AMERICA (2014)
Source: 2014 AmericasBarometer, Latin American Public Opinion Project
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while simultaneously disarming 
combatants and rebuilding infra-
structure. Honduras also faced for-
midable challenges during the 1990s, 
as its geographic proximity to the 
civil wars of its neighbors rendered 
it a destination for tens of thousands 
of refugees, as well as insurgents 
launching incursions across the 
borders.7 As in the post-conflict 
countries, democracy replaced 
authoritarian rule in Honduras in 
the 1990s, and the new democratic 
government faced the daunting chal-
lenge of disarming former combat-
ants, creating new civil institutions, 
and addressing the needs of citizens.
U.S. policy exacerbated post-
war problems in El Salvador and 
Honduras, as the United States 
deported record numbers of 
Salvadoran gang members (par-
ticularly from Los Angeles) back 
to postwar El Salvador, and most 
deportees could not find work in the 
legal economy.8 During this time of 
transition, the gangs solidified their 
criminal networks, cultivated ties 
with corrupt officials, and extended 
their presence to neighboring coun-
tries like Honduras. 
Nicaragua had to disarm combat-
ants and rebuild after decades of war, 
but it did not experience the same 
influx of gang activity during its 
transition to democracy. Nicaragua’s 
success at blocking gangs is partially 
due to its wartime experiences in the 
1980s, as the Sandinistas prioritized 
border security to thwart Contra 
attacks launched from Honduras. 
This emphasis on border security 
made it difficult for transnational 
gangs to enter Nicaragua even after 
the war. The Sandinistas also cre-
ated neighborhood-level defense 
organizations, which evolved into 
community associations that helped 
police neighborhoods and keep more 
dangerous foreign gangs out.9 Most 
importantly, the police of Nicaragua 
evolved quite differently from the 
other post-conflict countries of 
Central America, making a com-
plete break from their authoritarian 
and repressive past following the 
overthrow of the Somoza dynasty 
in 1979. Nicaragua’s new constitu-
tion created an apolitical, profes-
sional, and civilian police force, and 
stipulated that police must respect 
citizen rights and the rule of law. 
This foundation has led Nicaraguan 
police to emphasize prevention and 
intervention over repression when 
fighting crime. Nicaragua’s emphasis 
on crime prevention makes it harder 
for gangs to recruit disaffected youth 
and use prisons as training grounds 
for new members. Some youth join 
smaller-scale neighborhood pandil-
las, but large, sophisticated gangs 
have not established a stronghold 
in the country.10 Nicaragua is not 
completely immune to the influence 
of organized crime, however, as offi-
cials from the Nicaraguan National 
Police have faced charges of complic-
ity in money laundering and drug 
trafficking operations.11 Still, cartels 
and gangs do not have the same grip 
on the country’s government and 
economy as they do in Guatemala, El 
Salvador, and Honduras.
Panama has followed a very dif-
ferent political trajectory, but faced 
similar problems under democratic 
rule. Given its geographic location, 
Panama has long served as a hub 
facilitating the transfer of legal and 
illegal goods and services, and its 
role in illicit drug trade intensified 
in the 1980s under General Manuel 
Noriega. The U.S. Department of 
Justice interrupted Noriega’s lucrative 
yet illicit career when it issued a war-
rant for his arrest on drug trafficking 
charges. In 1989, the United States 
invaded Panama to enforce this 
warrant, subsequently destroying 
the Panamanian army and capturing 
Noriega. In the aftermath of the inva-
sion, Panama overhauled its security 
forces and created a civilian national 
police force. Democratic reforms 
transformed Panamanian institu-
tions throughout the 1990s, but the 
illicit sector proved resilient, particu-
larly as Panama’s strong international 
banking center and adoption of the 
U.S. dollar made it an appealing site 
for money laundering.12 
With its long history of democratic 
rule, Costa Rica did not experience 
the tumultuous political transitions 
of its neighbors in the 1990s. Indeed, 
Costa Rica’s stability has made it 
a destination for many migrants, 
particularly from Nicaragua. As 
noted above, following a 1998 agree-
ment between Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica, large numbers of Nicaraguans 
have migrated south for economic 
reasons, and according to rough 
estimates 8 percent of the population 
in Costa Rica is from Nicaragua.13 
Despite their different political 
histories, the Central American 
countries all experienced economic 
transformations in the 1980s and 
1990s. These economic transi-
tions led market forces, even illegal 
market forces like drug trafficking, 
Despite their different political 
histories, the Central American 
countries all experienced eco-
nomic transformations in the 
1980s and 1990s. These economic 
transitions led market forces, even 
illegal market forces like drug 
trafficking, to become far more 
powerful than many states. 
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to become far more powerful than 
many states.14 Economic reforms 
reduced government regulations 
of markets and trade while simul-
taneously trimming state budgets. 
Borders became more porous and 
created new opportunities for illicit 
actors to hide their profits among 
legal flows. In sum, the political and 
economic transitions of the 1990s 
weakened the power of the state, and 
created opportunities for non-state 
actors (such as organized crime syn-
dicates) to exert their influence. 
Today’s violence and criminal activ-
ity are also linked to developments 
elsewhere in the hemisphere. Joint 
U.S.-Colombian anti-drug operations 
reduced the power of Colombian car-
tels, and Mexican cartels moved in to 
fill the gap. When Mexico unleashed 
its war on drugs in 2006, the illicit 
drug market shifted its operations 
south into Central America. In 
2006, 23 percent of cocaine ship-
ments moving north passed through 
Central America. By 2011, this 
amount had jumped to 84 percent, as 
the Mexican offensive pressed cartel 
activity south.15 The shift in drug 
trafficking corridors corresponded to 
increases in violence in the Northern 
Triangle countries (Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras). 
Confronting the Crime 
Crisis: Successful 
Policing Strategies
With the exception of Costa Rica, 
the Central American governments 
of today have inherited daunting 
problems. There are clear differ-
ences in how these governments 
have confronted these challenges, 
however. In the Northern Triangle 
countries, governments have by 
and large responded to high rates of 
violence and organized crime with 
militarized (and often repressive) 
policing strategies. In Guatemala, 
El Salvador, and Honduras, “mano 
dura” (loosely translated as “iron 
fist”) policies rule the day, as 
politicians tend to respond to 
spiraling rates of public insecurity 
with increasingly harsher policing 
practices.16 Mano dura measures 
may help win votes during elections, 
but after almost two decades, they 
have failed to stymie rising rates of 
violent crime and have weakened 
state protections of civil liberties 
and human rights.
In contrast, Nicaragua and 
Panama have employed differ-
ent policing strategies. As noted 
above, Nicaragua embarked on 
police reform much earlier in 
its history, creating an entirely 
new civilian police force shortly 
after the 1979 revolution. The 
Contra War of the 1980s inter-
rupted the operations of this new 
police force, but with the return 
of democracy in the 1990s, atten-
tion turned once again to policing 
practices, and a series of reforms 
resulted in a community-oriented 
police force that emphasizes 
prevention over repression. In 
contrast to Honduras, where 
the military occasionally patrols 
alongside civilian police officers 
to conduct mass arrests, police 
officers in Nicaragua tend to be 
embedded in communities. Police 
officers are assigned to specific 
neighborhoods, and instructed to 
conduct regular patrols on foot 
and/or in vehicle. Police officers 
are also instructed to liaison with 
civil society groups, and in some 
areas police officials are encour-
aged to pursue university degrees 
in public administration. 
Reformers link these community-
oriented policing practices to a num-
ber of successful outcomes. Despite 
Nicaragua’s history of inequality and 
political violence, for the past two 
decades it has registered crime rates 
far lower than the rest of the region. 
At $4,500 per capita, Nicaragua’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) is less 
than a quarter of Costa Rica’s, yet its 
homicide rate is roughly the same. 
Nicaragua’s rate of violent crime 
is 75 percent lower than the other 
post-conflict countries in the region 
(Guatemala and El Salvador), despite 
registering slightly lower levels of 
GDP per capita than these countries. 
Furthermore, both state and societal 
forces tend to shun militarized polic-
ing practices, favoring preventive and 
community-based initiatives that do 
not run the same risk of jeopardiz-
ing human rights and civil liberties 
as their mano dura counterparts. In a 
2014 survey, Nicaraguans registered 
some of the highest levels of support 
in the region for preventive crime-
fighting practices, with 42 percent 
endorsing preventive measures (such 
as afterschool programs for youth, 
street lights, job training for first-time 
offenders) over punitive ones (for 
example, longer prison sentences for 
juvenile offenders, the death penalty, 
and detention without due process).17 
Promising police reforms in 
Panama have more recent origins. 
Homicide rates rose an alarm-
ing 90 percent in Panama from 
2000 through 2010, but a series of 
police reforms introduced in 2010 
corresponded with reduced rates 
of violent crime and more profes-
sional police forces. Reformers 
have prioritized a civilian, commu-
nity policing model in Panamanian 
cities, and have aimed to integrate 
police officers more cohesively 
into the communities they serve. 
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To increase the street presence of 
police, reformers strived to repli-
cate the Chilean model of divid-
ing the national territory into 
zones (“cuadrantes”) and assign-
ing a police station to each zone, 
along with the necessary vehicle 
and personnel resources. Police 
are responsible for personalizing 
themselves with the communities 
in their zone and working with 
residents and civic organizations 
to identify security concerns and 
solve community problems. Police 
salaries and professional train-
ing have improved substantially, 
and civil society groups tie such 
reforms to improved professional-
ism on the streets.18 
Public Evaluations of 
Police Performance
Survey data can help gauge empiri-
cally how well police reforms 
in Nicaragua and Panama have 
improved both police performance 
and police-community relation-
ships. The Latin American Public 
Opinion Project’s (LAPOP) 2014 
AmericasBarometer includes several 
survey questions that tap into public 
perceptions and evaluations of police 
forces throughout Central America. 
When we compare public perceptions 
of policing in Nicaragua and Panama 
to the countries of the Northern 
Triangle, we find that citizens register 
more positive evaluations in the coun-
tries that have introduced commu-
nity-oriented policing practices.
Trust in Police and Respect for 
Citizens’ Rights
Figure 3 reports national levels of 
trust in the police, and trust that 
citizens’ basic rights are protected 
in the country. Respondents in 
Nicaragua and Panama registered 
FIGURE 3: TRUST IN POLICE AND RESPECT FOR CITIZENS’ RIGHTS (2014)
Source: 2014 AmericasBarometer, Latin American Public Opinion Project
significantly higher levels of trust in 
police than respondents from other 
countries in the region.19 When 
asked whether they trusted the 
political system to respect citizens’ 
rights, respondents in Nicaragua 
and Panama also reported sig-
nificantly higher levels of trust 
than respondents in the Northern 
Triangle countries. As Figure 3 indi-
cates, perceptions that citizen rights 
are protected were significantly 
higher in Nicaragua and Panama 
compared to the other countries 
that transitioned to democracy in 
the 1990s.20 Thus, the survey data 
indicate that the two democratizing 
countries that have employed com-
munity-friendly policing reforms 
also report significantly higher 
levels of trust in police and percep-
tions that basic rights are protected. 
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Given the legacy of human rights 
abuses in Nicaragua and Panama, 
this finding is promising. Under 
authoritarian rule, one of the major 
grievances was that police and 
military forces frequently abused 
the human rights of the citizenry. 
The survey results here indicate that 
Nicaragua and Panama have made 
progress on this crucial front.
Efficacy of the Justice System
To measure citizen evaluations of 
the efficacy of the justice system, 
commonly understood as com-
prising both the police and the 
courts, LAPOP asked respondents 
in Central America whether they 
would trust the justice system to 
punish the guilty party if they were 
victimized by a crime.21 As Figure 4 
illustrates, once again respondents 
in Nicaragua and Panama report 
significantly higher levels of trust 
that the justice system is capable 
of convicting perpetrators of 
crime. Perhaps surprisingly, Costa 
Rica scores low on this measure. 
Interviews with Costa Rican justice 
officials, police officers, and victims’ 
advocates suggest that these low 
scores are most likely due to public 
frustration with a sharp and sud-
den increase in violent crime in the 
2000s, and the perceived inability 
of the police to address criminality 
decisively. Traditionally accustomed 
to high levels of public safety and 
professional police forces, Costa 
Ricans have reacted swiftly and 
negatively to abrupt deteriorations 
in the status quo.
Other survey items indicate that 
there is still room for improvement 
in police performance. In 2014, 
LAPOP included a new survey item 
to measure respondents’ evaluations 
of police response times: “Suppose 
that someone robbed your house 
FIGURE 4: TRUST THE JUSTICE SYSTEM WILL PUNISH THE GUILTY PARTY
Source: 2014 AmericasBarometer, Latin American Public Opinion Project
and you called the police. How much 
time do you think the police would 
take to get to your house on a typical 
day around noon?” Respondents 
could select among five options: (1) 
less than 10 minutes, (2) between ten 
to 30 minutes, (3) more than 30 min-
utes but less than an hour, (4) more 
than an hour but less than three 
hours, (5) more than three hours. 
If respondents replied on their own 
that the police would never arrive, 
they were coded as (6). Figure 5 
reports average estimates of response 
time in each Central American 
country. While Panama joins Costa 
Rica with the shortest response 
times of the region, Nicaraguans 
report the longest estimated response 
times. Still, there are some positive 
results from the Nicaraguan sur-
vey. In Nicaragua, there were no 
significant linkages between antici-
pated police response time and the 
race, ethnicity, wealth, education, 
income, and gender of respondents. 
In all of the other Central American 
countries, respondents with darker 
skin reported significantly longer 
anticipated police response times. In 
Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala, wealthier respondents 
also reported significantly shorter 
anticipated police response times. So 
while Nicaraguans perceive police 
as slow to respond to their calls, we 
do not find the same socioeconomic 
and racial differences in police 
responsiveness as we observe in 
other Central American countries.
Discussion
Given the severity of the Central 
American crime crisis, coupled 
with long historical legacies of 
inequality, poverty, and repression, 
the governments of the Northern 
Triangle countries face a difficult 
task ahead. To address the crime 
wave and subsequent migration 
crisis, these Central American 
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leaders can exert little control 
over U.S. laws on drugs, guns, 
and immigration. However, they 
can invest in police institutions 
that respond to the needs of their 
citizens, and ensure that crime-
fighting tactics respect citizens’ 
rights. The case of Nicaragua in 
particular illustrates that even 
countries with few resources can 
choose to channel those resources 
wisely. In Nicaragua and Panama, 
national surveys indicate that 
the public registers more trust in 
police and more positive evalua-
tions of respect for citizen rights. 
Respondents in these countries 
also are more likely to think that 
the justice system can sanction 
criminals effectively. In Panama, 
respondents also estimate that 
police response times will be rea-
sonable—between 10 minutes to 
less than an hour. However, there 
are significant socio-economic 
and wealth disparities in people’s 
evaluations of police responsive-
ness. People with lower levels of 
education and income estimate that 
police will be slower to respond 
than their wealthier, more educated 
counterparts. Likewise, women 
and people of color also anticipate 
slower police response times.
The United States has a vested 
interest in promoting community-
oriented policing strategies in the 
region. Traditionally, the United 
States has prioritized militarized 
public security strategies over 
preventive ones in its foreign aid 
allocations. American police consul-
tants such as William Bratton and 
Rudolph Giuliani have reinforced 
this message as they have success-
fully lobbied many Latin American 
governments to import their 
model of zero tolerance policing, 
which has coincided with a spike 
in human rights violations in some 
urban areas. Given the inability of 
these militarized policing strategies 
to curb violent crime in Central 
America, the United States has 
shifted its focus slightly. In 2008, 
the United States launched the 
Central American Regional Security 
Initiative (CARSI), investing $642 
million to date to fight crime by 
investing in “community policing, 
gang prevention, and economic 
and social programming for at-
risk youth and communities.”22 
Neighborhoods participating in 
the program report lower levels 
of violent and non-violent crime, 
increased trust in police, and lower 
levels of gang activity.23 While these 
reports are promising, CARSI’s 
funding is trivial given the scope 
and severity of the security crisis. 
Latin American presidents have 
called upon the United States to 
increase funding for CARSI, with 
little success. To address the Central 
American migrant crisis, President 
Obama requested $1 billion to 
target the root causes of poverty 
and crime that lead so many people, 
particularly children, to embark on 
the perilous journey north. In June 
of 2015, the U.S. Congress reserved 
less than $300 million for this effort. 
If the United States aims to reduce 
the number of people fleeing north, 
it must invest more seriously in 
policing and public security prac-
tices that have a track record of 
success. After almost two decades, 
it is clear that iron fist, repressive 
policing strategies do not work. As 
the cases of Nicaragua and Panama 
demonstrate, community-oriented 
policing strategies are effective 
in building citizens’ trust in their 
police and fostering a culture of 
respect for human rights.
FIGURE 5: PERCEIVED LENGTH OF POLICE RESPONSE TIME
Source: 2014 AmericasBarometer, Latin American Public Opinion Project
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Data
This brief relies upon public opin-
ion data from the 2004–2014 
AmericasBarometer datasets, 
conducted by the Latin American 
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of 
Vanderbilt University (http://www.
vanderbilt.edu/lapop/). The author 
would like to thank LAPOP and 
its major supporters (the United 
States Agency for International 
Development, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and Vanderbilt 
University) for making the data 
available. Homicide data are avail-
able through the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime’s 
(UNODC) Global Study on 
Homicide (http://www.unodc.org/
gsh/en/data.html). 
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